





DISMANTLING THE TRAP: 
UNTANGLING THE CHAIN OF EVENTS IN EXCESSIVE 
FORCE CLAIMS 
 
By Cara McClellan1 
 
In the wake of repeated police shootings of unarmed 
Black men and women, police departments across the country 
are focusing on de-escalation.  Yet federal courts reviewing 
Fourth Amendment excessive force violations are often 
unwilling to take into account how an officer’s pre-seizure 
conduct may have affected the need to use force during a 
civilian encounter.  I argue that as part of the Graham v. 
Connor reasonableness analysis, courts reviewing excessive 
force claims should consider prior police conduct that impacted 
the need for force when the officer predictably causes the 
civilian to respond by employing an overly aggressive tactic.  I 
provide examples of how traditional principles of causation in 
tort law could apply and provide a workable approach.  
Moreover, I argue that the severity of the crime provides context 
that is essential to interpreting causation in the entire chain of 
events that occurs during the police-civilian interaction. 
 
“We were coming from playing basketball and 
some of us weren’t even wearing our t-shirts.  [The 
police] started patting us down like we’re gonna have a 
gun in our shorts.  One of the police officers actually 
took the food I just bought and threw it down and was 
like ‘You got an issue with what I just did?’ I guess they 
were trying to start an issue where they could arrest 
me.  I wanted to talk back. I actually started talking 
back, but then I just got quiet.  ’Cause I’m basically 
falling for their trap.  If they want me to be locked up 
                                                        
1 Cara McClellan is a Skadden Fellow at the NAACP Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund. B.A. 2010, Yale College; M.S.Ed 2012, University of 
Pennsylvania; J.D. 2015, Yale Law School.  
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then they want me to say something back or do 
something.”2 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE TRAP 
 
How does a conversation about a broken brake light 
escalate into a fatal shooting? On July 6, 2016, Officer 
Jeronimo Yanez stopped Philando Castile on a busy street in 
Falcon Heights, Minnesota.  His girlfriend sat in the 
passenger seat and his daughter in the backseat.  The traffic 
                                                        
 2 This quotation comes from interviews completed in New Haven, 
Connecticut, in 2010 as part of an ethnographic study on how inner-city 
students view the police. Cara McClellan, Teacher/Police: How Inner-City 
Students Perceive the Connection Between the Education System and the 
Criminal Justice System, 8 YALE J. SOC. 53, 60 (2012). The young adults 
interviewed expressed a belief that the police profile youth of color as 
criminals, not as citizens who deserve protection.  
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stop was pretextual—Officer Yanez was not in fact motivated 
to stop Castile because his brake light was broken, but 
because he believed Castile matched the description of a 
robbery suspect based on his Afrocentric features, specifically 
his “wide-set nose.”3  Officer Yanez requested that Mr. Castile 
provide his license and registration. Before moving, Mr. 
Castile informed the officer that he possessed a firearm in the 
car that he was lawfully registered to carry.4  Officer Yanez 
then yelled “do not pull it out!” and Castile responded that he 
would not.  Still when Castile began to reach for his ID and 
wallet as requested, Officer Yanez quickly fired seven shots 
killing Castile. 
 
The frequent use of excessive force by police against 
civilians, particularly young, African American men and 
women, is one of the most significant problems our country 
faces.5  In the past several years, this issue has entered the 
public consciousness as a result of several widely publicized 
shootings and other uses of excessive force. 6   Like many 
                                                        
 3  Mitch Smith, Video of Police Killing of Philando Castile Is 
Publicly Released, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/police-shooting-castile-trial-
video.html.  
 4 Stephen Rex Brown, Philando Castile Had a Permit for the Gun 
He Carried When Minnesota Cop Shot Him to Death, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 
9, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/philando-
castileminnesotagun-permit-article-1.2705537.  
 5 According to the Washington Post, there were 963 civilians killed 
by police officers in 2016.  John Sullivan, et al., Number of Fatal Shootings 
By Police Is Nearly Identical To Last Year, WASH. POST (July 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/number-of-fatal-shootings-
by-police-is-nearly-identical-to-last-year/2017/07/01/98726cc6-5b5f-11e7-
9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html?utm_term=.7fda7ac5ef80.  African American 
males represent nearly 1/4 of unarmed people killed by police, but only 6% 
of the population. Id. Police violence against African American women and 
African American transgender people is also a significant, but difficult to 
measure problem. See generally ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE 
POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017).   
 6 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury and Police Violence 
Against Black Men, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 209–234 (Angela J. Davis 
ed., 2017) (documenting a recent history of African American men killed by 
police);  KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE, SAY HER 
NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2015), 
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others, I have watched footage of these shootings, which 
repeatedly reveal officers responding aggressively with scant 
evidence of a threat to the officers’ safety.  Like many others, 
I have wondered: how did the situation escalate so quickly?  
 
There are, no doubt, multiple explanations, including 
implicit bias and stereotypes that lead officers to view African 
Americans as threatening.7  My goal in this Article is not to 
provide a comprehensive account of the problem or potential 
solutions, but merely to suggest a role that Fourth 
Amendment excessive force jurisprudence can play in 
deterring the use of police tactics that contribute to the need 
for officers to use force.  
 
Interactions between police and young, African 
American men and women are often highly charged 
challenges to personal dignity and safety. 8   Many young 
people experience these encounters as a sort of quandary (or 
as the quotation describes it, a “trap”), in which they must 
submit to unfair and aggressive treatment because they risk 
violence and criminal punishment.9  As in the quotation at the 
start, many African Americans describe a feeling that officers 
behaved in a way that was disproportionate to what was 
                                                        
https://perma.cc/4DU5-7BQT (documenting a recent history of African 
American women killed by police).  
7  See, e.g., Kimberly Barsamian Kahn & Paul G. Davies, 
Differentially Dangerous? Phenotypic Racial Stereotypicality Increases 
Implicit Bias Among Ingroup and Outgroup Members, 14 GROUP PROCESSES 
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 569 (2011) (finding that Black targets with 
darker skin, broader noses, and fuller lips elicited stronger implicit bias in 
split-second “shoot/don’t shoot” situations than other targets. 
 8 See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, Who’s the Man?: Masculinities 
Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, COLUM. J. OF GENDER AND L. 671 
(2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1257183 
(arguing that police use Terry stops as an act of domination to validate their 
sense of esteem and masculinity).  
 9 My purpose in describing this experience is not to suggest that 
police stops which lack suspicion and serve to humiliate young men and 
women cause a harm that can be equated with police encounters that end 
in the use of lethal force, but rather that the two are connected when one 
considers how police encounters escalate to involve force that could have 
been prevented. 
No. 1:1]          DISMANTLING THE TRAP 5
 
 
warranted in the situation and designed to provoke a 
response. 
 
Department of Justice investigations of police practices 
in Ferguson and Baltimore, which found systemic 
overreliance on excessive force against African American 
civilians,10 have highlighted the need to focus on deescalating 
police-civilian encounters in order to minimize the need to use 
force.  The resulting consent decrees require police to undergo 
de-escalation training and employ new tactics that include 
slowing down the pace of an incident, waiting out subjects, 
creating distance between the officer and the threat, and 
requesting additional resources, such as behavioral 
healthcare providers, to reduce the need for force. 11   The 
fundamental insight of de-escalation research and training is 
that “tactics leading up to the use of force can influence 
whether the force used was necessary.”12  
 
 In stark contrast with this approach, this Article will 
describe how the majority of federal courts continue to analyze 
police encounters without considering how the officer’s 
conduct may have impacted the need for force.  Part I outlines 
controlling law determining whether a police officer used 
excessive force, applying a totality of the circumstances test.  
Part II explains how federal courts of appeal apply the totality 
                                                        
 10 The Department of Justice determined that the Ferguson Police 
Department used excessive force discriminatorily against African 
Americans.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 28 (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.  
 11  See, e.g., Baltimore Consent Decree at 43, United States v. 
Baltimore Police Dep’t., No. CV JKB-17-99, 2017 WL 1301500 (D. Md. Apr. 
7, 2017) (ECF No. 2–2), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925056/download 
[hereinafter Baltimore Consent Decree].  Seven police forces across the 
country are piloting a de-escalation training program known as Integrating 
Communications, Assessment and Tactics developed by the Police Executive 
Research Forum and the Department of Justice’s Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services. See generally POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH 
FORUM, INTEGRATING COMMUNICATIONS, ASSESSMENT AND TACTICS (2016), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/icattrainingguide.pdf.  
 12 Consent Decree at 51. 
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of the circumstances analysis differently, describing three 
approaches: (1) courts that do not consider any evidence of 
police conduct prior to the seizure; (2) courts that apply a 
segmented approach and consider earlier police misconduct 
separately from the seizure that constitutes the alleged 
excessive force; and (3) courts that apply tort principles of 
proximate causation to determine whether police conduct is 
directly connected to the use of excessive force.  Part III 
describes the recent County of Los Angeles v. Mendez decision 
in which the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
provocation doctrine, but left open the question of whether a 
totality of the circumstances analysis should consider earlier 
conduct that caused the need to use force.13  Part IV argues 
that the severity of the crime provides essential context for 
determining causation and whether an officer took an overly 
aggressive tactic that foreseeably created a civilian response.  
The conclusion offers reflections on why in today’s world of 
pervasive criminal regulation and pretext policing it is 
essential that courts understand excessive force claims as an 
entire chain of events.  It argues that if current excessive force 
jurisprudence does not change, the next generation of 
minority citizens will grow up feeling “trapped” by police 
conduct, undermining the legitimacy of our criminal justice 
system and American democracy. 14   
 
II. OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS UNDER THE TOTALITY 
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
A seizure occurs when police use force or assert 
authority in a way that causes a civilian to submit.15  The 
Fourth Amendment governs the ways in which officers are 
permitted to assert authority and use force in conducting an 
                                                        
 13 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).  
 14 See Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal 
Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 159, 160 (2014) (discussing the different ways in which the criminal 
justice system educates African American youth and shapes their view of 
the legitimacy of the democracy).  
 15 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).  
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investigatory stop or seizure under particular 
circumstances. 16   Victims of excessive police force can sue 
police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 17 and claim that an 
officer’s action violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard. 18  Although not the focus of this 
Article, it is important to note that in order to overcome 
qualified immunity, the alleged violation must have been 
clearly established at the time the officer acted.19 
 
In Graham v. Connor, 20  the Supreme Court 
established an objective reasonableness test to determine 
whether an officer’s use of force violated the Fourth 
Amendment, balancing “the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”21  
Ultimately, the question is whether a reasonable officer would 
have believed that the use of force was necessary.  The Court 
in Graham outlined three factors to consider: “the severity of 
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.”22  
                                                        
 16 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985) (The question to be 
decided is “whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular 
sort of . . . seizure.”).  
 17 In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows: Every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law.  
 18 Id. at 395.  
19 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (“whether an 
official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an 
allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal 
reasonableness’ of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were 
‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken”) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982)).  
 20 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  
 21 Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 
(1983).)  
 22 Id.  
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The totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court 
explained, must be conducted from the officer’s perspective “at 
the moment” that the use of force occurred.23  “Not every push 
or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of 
a judge’s chambers . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” 24  
Instead, the calculus of reasonableness must allow “for the 
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary 
in a particular situation.”25 
 
Following Graham v. Connor, lower courts were left to 
interpret the relevant timeframe for evaluating an officer’s 
conduct under an excessive force claim.26  The approaches of 
the different federal courts of appeal can generally be divided 
into three groups.  First, there are courts that hold that pre-
seizure officer conduct is never relevant.  Second, some courts 
apply a segmented approach, considering allegations of police 
misconduct earlier in the encounter separately from the 
alleged seizure that constituted excessive force.  Third, some 
courts apply a test that considers how attenuated earlier 
police conduct is to the force employed in order to determine 
whether to admit evidence of pre-seizure conduct.  
                                                        
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. at 396–97 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d 
Cir. 1973)).  
25 Id. at 396. 
 26 See Aaron Kimber, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure? 
The Relevance of an Officer’s Pre-Seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force 
Claim, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 651, 654 (2004) (“The specific set of 
factors that fall within [the totality of the circumstances test] is not clear, 
and the circuits have split on whether pre-seizure police conduct leading up 
to the use of force is within its scope.”) (collecting cases); Michael Avery, 
Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of 
Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against 
Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 265 (2003) 
(“While some circuits have held that officers’ actions leading up to a violent 
incident should be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the 
officers’ use of force, others have taken a narrower view, holding that police 
actions prior to a shooting are not relevant in assessing the reasonableness 
of the force used.”) (collecting cases).  
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Importantly, all courts consider the civilian’s conduct as a 
factor in the analysis; the disagreement lies only as to whether 
it is appropriate to consider the officer’s pre-seizure conduct.  
 
III. EVALUATING POLICE CONDUCT IN EXCESSIVE FORCE 
CLAIMS  
 
A. Courts That Exclude All Pre-Seizure Conduct 
 
 The Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have 
generally held that an officer’s pre-seizure conduct is not 
relevant under Graham.27  These courts rely on language in 
Graham stating that the analysis should consider what the 
officer knew at the moment the use of force occurred, since 
officers are forced to make “split-second judgments.”28  Courts 
excluding pre-seizure conduct reason that reasonableness is 
determined based only on the information possessed by the 
officer at the moment that force is employed.  For example, in 
Schulz v. Long, the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff’s 
evidence that an officer’s conduct prior to the moment of a 
seizure led to a need to use force must be excluded. 29  
Schulz involved a paranoid schizophrenic who barricaded 
himself in his parents’ basement.  His parents called the police 
for help.  The Schulz court declined to consider whether the 
                                                        
 27 See, e.g., Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[The 
officer’s] actions leading up to the shooting are irrelevant to the objective 
reasonableness of his conduct at the moment he decided to employ deadly 
force.”); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
police chase of a fleeing tractor trailer was not relevant to the subsequent 
shooting of the civilian driver because courts should consider “only the 
seizure itself, and not the events leading up to the seizure, for 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment”); Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 
25 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (limiting review to the exact moment when 
the officer’s shooting began because “[r]econsideration will nearly always 
reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the 
future before it occurred” (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 
(7th Cir. 1994))).  
 28 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.  
 29 Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 647–48 (8th Cir. 1995).  
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police mishandled the events leading up to the moment the 
officer shot Schulz.30  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the 
Graham Court’s use of the phrase “at the moment” in 
describing the reasonableness inquiry indicated that the 
reasonableness review extends only to those facts “known to 
the officer at the precise moment the officers effectuate the 
seizure.” 31  These facts included that the plaintiff was armed 
with a double-bladed axe. According to the Schulz court, 
because the seizure was reasonable at the moment that it 
occurred, the facts leading up to the seizure were irrelevant.  
To hold otherwise would limit an officer’s ability to defend 
himself during a rapidly evolving and increasingly dangerous 
encounter.  
 
B. Courts That Apply The Segmented Approach 
 
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have 
generally reached the conclusion that “pre-seizure conduct is 
not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”32  In some cases, 
when faced with multiple claims of unreasonable police action, 
these courts attempt to divide prior events from those 
immediately preceding the use of force by splitting 
interactions into temporal segments and then analyzing the 
moments immediately before each violation separately. 33  
This approach allows courts flexibility.  As the Sixth Circuit 
described in Greathouse v. Couch:34  
                                                        
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 648.  
 32 Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations 
omitted). See also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that the reasonableness of the officer’s actions in creating the dangerous 
situation is not relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis); Young v. City 
of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that an officer may use 
lethal force when threatened even if he negligently failed to follow procedure 
and created the circumstances leading to the need for force).  
 33 Livermore v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The 
proper approach . . . is to view excessive force claims in segments” and 
“disregard” events in earlier segments in analyzing subsequent claims of 
excessive force.)  
 34 Greathouse v. Couch, 433 F. App’x 370 (6th Cir. 2011).  
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We apply a “segmented approach” to excessive-
force claims, in which we “carve up” the events 
surrounding the challenged police action and 
evaluate the reasonableness of the force by 
looking only at the moments immediately 
preceding the officer’s use of force . . . Our 
segmented approach applies even to encounters 
lasting very short periods of time.35 
 
In Plakas v. Drinski, the Seventh Circuit elaborated on 
the justification for the segmented approach, explaining that 
“[t]he time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases” 
because “[o]ther than random attacks, all such cases begin 
with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to 
arrest, to inquire. . . . In this sense, the police officer always 
causes the trouble.”36 
 
In Boyd v. Baeppler, officers received a radio call that 
an African American male had fired a shot, pointed a gun at 
three people outside of a Wendy’s, and fled. 37  Shortly after, 
the officers claimed they saw Boyd, who met the description of 
the suspect, running with a gun in his hand.38  According to 
the officers, when they could not persuade Boyd to stop, they 
shot and killed him.39  Analyzing the officers’ use of force in 
segments, the majority of the panel found that only the facts 
surrounding the officers’ confrontation with Boyd were 
relevant, including Boyd’s failure to respond to demands that 
he stop running and officer testimony that Boyd pointed a gun 
at the officers in the seconds before he was shot. 40   The 
majority excluded as irrelevant evidence of the circumstances 
leading up to the encounter, including evidence as to whether 
Boyd was running from the officers in an attempt to escape, 
whether Boyd had in fact fired the reported shot, and whether 
                                                        
 35 Id. at 372–73 (internal citations omitted).  
 36 Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994).  
 37 Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2000).  
 38 Id.  
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 601.  
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Boyd had committed any crime prior to being confronted by 
the police.41   
 
 The segmented approach does not lead to consistent 
rules, particularly because it is difficult to determine how to 
divide an encounter into temporal segments.  The Sixth 
Circuit admitted in Claybrook v. Birchwe that the events in 
that case were not so easily divided. 42   The case involved 
undercover police officers shooting a civilian, Claybrook, after 
approaching him in an unmarked car and, without identifying 
themselves, demanding that he drop his weapon. 43  
Claybrook’s estate alleged that the officers fired the first shot, 
causing Claybrook to return fire.44  Later, during a second 
exchange of fire, Claybrook positioned himself behind concrete 
steps and pointed a gun at the officers.45  It was during this 
second exchange that Claybrook was ultimately killed.   
 The officers argued that events should be divided into 
two segments: the first beginning with the officers’ decision to 
confront Claybrook through the initial firefight between the 
officers and Claybrook, and the second beginning when 
Claybrook hid behind the concrete steps and ending with the 
shots that killed him.  From this perspective, evidence that 
the officers approached Claybrook out of uniform, in an 
unmarked car, and opened fire on Claybrook, would be 
excluded from the analysis of whether the use of lethal force 
was reasonable because only the second round of firing 
resulted in the officers’ lethal shooting of Claybrook.46  The 
court rejected this approach, opting instead to divide the 
events into three segments: “first, the officers’ approach and 
                                                        
 41 Id. at 599–600.  
 42 Claybrook v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d 1098, 1103–05 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(segmenting a 1-2 minute encounter and finding the earlier shots that did 
not hit the suspect should be used in analyzing whether the deadly force 
was reasonable, even though it excluded evidence of the officers’ actions 
leading up to the beginning of the shooting).  
 43 Id. at 1104–05.  
 44 Id.  
45 Id. at 1102 (quoting Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 355 
(6th Cir. 2000)).  
 46 Id. at 1104. 
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confrontation of Claybrook; second, the initial firefight . . . ; 
and third, the shots fired after Claybrook’s move to a position 
behind the concrete steps.”47  Under these circumstances, the 
Claybrook court concluded that the officers could not justify 
their use of lethal force as self-defense.  The court explained 
that it reached this result because “plaintiffs brought suit to 
contest all use of deadly force . . . not only the shot that took 
his life.”48  Thus, the court was willing to segment earlier 
police misconduct prior to shots being fired, but not after.  
In Williams v. Indiana State Police Dep’t, the Seventh 
Circuit admitted that its own application of case law was “far 
from clear as to the relevance of pre-seizure conduct, or even 
as to a determination as to what conduct falls within the 
designation ‘pre-seizure.’” 49   The court explained that 
although the majority of its cases held that pre-seizure 
conduct may not form the basis for a Fourth Amendment 
claim, that did not “mean that [] pre-seizure conduct is 
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment claim.  The sequence of 
events leading up to the seizure is relevant because the 
reasonableness of the seizure is evaluated in light of the 
totality of the circumstances.”50  
 
The Fourth Circuit initially rejected segmenting, but 
later changed course.  In Rowland v. Perry, the civilian, 
                                                        
 47 Id. at 1105.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 482–83 (7th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom.; Blanchard v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 1712 
(2016). Compare Marion v. City of Corydon, Indiana, 559 F.3d 700, 705 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (“Pre-seizure police conduct cannot serve as a basis for liability 
under the Fourth Amendment; we limit our analysis to, force used when a 
seizure occurs.”), and McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Even unreasonable, unjustified, or outrageous conduct by an officer is not 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if it does not involve a seizure.” 
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)) with Sledd v. 
Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282, 288 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing that under Seventh 
Circuit law, if an officer conceals his identity as an officer, doctrine 
controlling the use of lethal force is modified because an officer 
“unreasonably create[s an] encounter that [leads] to a use of force” by 
“entering a private residence late at night with no indication of identity”).  
 50 Williams, 797 F.3d at 483.  
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Rowland, was a thirty-seven-year-old man who was mildly 
retarded.51  Although the accounts of the officer, Officer Perry, 
and Rowland differed, what was clear was that the officer 
believed that Rowland had picked up a five dollar bill after he 
saw a woman drop it, the officer told Rowland to return it, and, 
for whatever reason, Rowland did not do so.  The officer 
confronted Rowland and a struggle began.  At some point, 
Officer Perry twisted Rowland’s leg, tearing his anterior 
cruciate ligament such that Rowland later required surgery 
and was left partially disabled.52  Officer Perry argued that 
the excessive force claim should be analyzed in stages, or, in 
other words, through a segmented approach. 53   The court 
rejected Perry’s proposed approach as “miss[ing] the forest for 
the trees.”54  “Artificial divisions in the sequence of events do 
not aid a court’s evaluation of objective reasonableness.” 55  
The court then applied the Graham factors and concluded “it 
is impossible to escape the conclusion that a man suffered a 
serious leg injury over a lost five dollar bill.”56  
 
In Waterman v. Batton,57 a divided panel of the Fourth 
Circuit adopted a different approach.  The case involved an 
encounter in which police officers fired an initial round of 
gunfire at a motorist and then seconds later another round.  
The officers argued that the shots should not be analyzed in 
segments.  The panel interpreted the controlling cases as 
failing to clearly establish whether events should not be 
reviewed outside the “context of the conduct that precipitated 
the seizure,”58 and whether a segmented analysis should be 
applied.59  The Waterman court then looked at the officer’s use 
of lethal force, applying the segmented approach, and 
determined that while the early rounds of gunfire were 
                                                        
 51 Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1994).  
 52 Id. at 171–72.  
 53 Id. at 173.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 174.  
 57 Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) 
 58 Id. at 480.  
 59 Id.  
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justified, the later rounds were not, because the immediate 
threat to officer safety had been alleviated.60  As Waterman 
reveals, courts that try divide an incident into segments are 
often concerned that the reasonableness analysis changes 
during prolonged encounters as circumstances change.61  This 
is true both in cases where officers are faced with a growing 
threat that justifies increasing use of force, and where the 
threat is alleviated and the justification decreases with time. 
 
Yet while the strength of the segmented approach is 
the flexibility to adjust the analysis as circumstances change, 
the weakness of the segmented approach is that it can be 
easily manipulated to reach an intended result.  Indeed, 
courts seem to be segmenting events when necessary to avoid 
reaching a disturbing result, such as in Claybrook where 
manipulating the divisions between segments could have 
resulted in the exclusion of evidence that undercover officers 
ambushed and began shooting at a civilian without warning.62  
Moreover, as the Claybrook court recognized, segmenting can 
lead to inconsistent results.  In short, a segmented approach 
does not provide a principle for courts to determine how pre-
seizure circumstances are relevant to the eventual use of 
force.  
 
                                                        
 60  Id. at 482 (holding that the later round of gunfire was 
unconstitutional, but that the law at the time was not clearly established in 
order to defeat qualified immunity). 
 61 See Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n.9 (6th Cir. 
1996) (observing that a different analysis may apply if it is determined that 
the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable, but there was no 
justification for continuing to shoot); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 
(7th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer faces a situation in which he could 
justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot at any time thereafter 
with impunity.”); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(dividing an encounter into two segments and holding that even if the use 
of deadly force was justified initially, “the exigency of the situation lessened 
dramatically” and the later use of lethal force was unreasonable).  
62 Claybrook, 274 F.3d at 1104. 
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As Judge Higginbotham excoriated in Mason v. 
Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 63 appellate 
judges have yet to explain “from where [they] derive[] the 
authority to slice a single event and choose from the resulting 
parts of the appeal which to decide.”64  In Mason, a Fifth 
Circuit panel was asked to consider an encounter in which a 
police officer fired multiple shots with decreasing justification.  
In his partial dissent, Judge Higginbotham wrote: “I am at sea 
as to why the majority slices a single event into 
distinct segments—seven shots into five and two—then 
performs the proper analysis with respect to one segment—
the final two shots . . .”65  
 
Indeed, a segmenting approach could result in courts 
excluding evidence that the officer himself created the 
justification for his later use of force.  This is because a test 
that focuses on dividing pre-seizure evidence based on 
temporal limitations is not suited to analyze a dynamic 
interaction between an officer and a civilian.  As will be 
discussed in the next section, a causation analysis better 
provides the flexibility required to determine whether an 
officer’s pre-seizure conduct is sufficiently connected to the 
use of force to be relevant to the reasonableness 
determination.  
 
C. Courts That Consider Pre-Seizure Conduct 
Relevant When Connected To The Need To Use 
Force Under Traditional Principles Of Causation 
 
The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have all held that 
a police officer’s actions prior to the use of force are relevant 
                                                        
 63 Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 288 
(5th Cir. 2015) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting in part) (“At some point, an 
officer crosses the line between setting up a risky situation and actually 
himself directly causing the ‘threat.’”). 
 64 Id. at 285–86.  
 65 Id. at 285. 
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in the reasonableness analysis. 66   These courts interpret 
Graham’s “moment of” the seizure language as preventing the 
judge from applying a hindsight perspective, and not 
prohibiting the judge from considering an officer’s earlier 
conduct in the reasonableness analysis.67  This interpretation 
of Graham makes sense when one considers that the opinion 
later explains: “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later 
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers . . . 
violates the Fourth Amendment.” 68   Read in context, 
Graham’s “at the moment” language prohibits judges from 
imposing their own perspective, and not from considering any 
pre-seizure police conduct.  
 
Graham explicitly identifies the severity of the crime 
as one of the factors that courts must consider, and therefore 
requires courts to contextualize an interaction beyond the 
temporal period when the seizure happened.  Similarly, the 
pre-seizure conduct of a police officer is a non-
contemporaneous factor that can provide context for 
interpreting the reasonableness of the seizure itself.69  This is 
                                                        
 66 See, e.g., St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“court[s] should examine the actions of the government officials 
leading up to the seizure.”).  
 67 See, e.g., Young v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 
4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining its approach “is most consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s mandate that we consider these cases in the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’” (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, at 8–9 (1985)); 
Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999) (“we do not see how [an 
alternative approach] can reconcile the Supreme Court’s rule requiring 
examination of the “totality of the circumstances” with a rigid rule that 
excludes all context and causes prior to the moment the seizure is finally 
accomplished”); Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (“This 
approach is simply a specific application of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ 
approach inherent in the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.” 
(quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9)).  
 68 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). See Bella v. Chamberlin, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 
1994) (“Obviously, events immediately connected with the actual seizure 
are taken into account in determining whether the seizure is reasonable.”).  
 69  See Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasizing that it is relevant that the arrest warrant the officers 
attempted to serve was for a misdemeanor charge). The Deering court went 
on to explain that: “Reasonableness depends on the information the officer 
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consistent with how courts generally review reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment by considering the prior 
conduct of the police officer. 70  Courts excluding pre-seizure 
conduct treat the reasonable officer as if he or she has no 
memory that informs his or her perspective. 71  
 
 In Abraham v. Raso, after collecting cases from 
different circuits, the Third Circuit concluded that courts lack 
“any principled way of explaining when ‘pre-seizure’ events 
start and, consequently, will not have any defensible 
justification for why conduct prior to that chosen moment 
should be excluded.”72  The Raso court explained that under 
the facts of the case before it, excluding evidence of the officer’s 
pre-seizure conduct would effectively mean that it would be 
asked to consider whether Officer Raso used excessive force in 
shooting a suspect, Abraham, without considering the 
“circumstances before the moment Abraham was actually 
struck by Raso’s bullet.”73  The Raso court provided several 
reasons for rejecting the doctrine that pre-seizure police 
conduct is irrelevant. First, such a “problematic justification” 
might be “understood as only excluding evidence that helps 
the plaintiff show the force was excessive” or “undermines the 
estate’s case.” 74   Second, “there are considerable practical 
problems with trying to wrest from a complex series of events 
all and only the evidence that hurts the plaintiff.”75  Finally, 
                                                        
possesses prior to and at the immediate time of the shooting . . . . What [the 
deputy] knew about [the suspect] and the basis for the warrant would seem 
to fall within these parameters.” Id. at 650.  
 70 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011) (holding that 
police can invoke exigent circumstances in order to conduct a warrantless 
search only “when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is 
reasonable” and “the police did not create the exigency by engaging or 
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment”).  
 71 See, e.g., Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 483 
(7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the circumstances known by [the officer], 
or even created by him, inform the determination as to whether the lethal 
response was an objectively reasonable one”).  
 72 Raso, 183 F.3d  at 291–92.  
 73 Id. at 291.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id.  
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the court reasoned that the term “totality” as used in Graham 
“implies that reasonableness should be sensitive to all of the 
factors bearing on the officer’s use of force.”76  
 Instead, the Raso court concluded that whether an 
officer’s pre-seizure conduct should be considered as part of 
the totality of the circumstances analysis should  be 
determined by applying traditional principles of causation: 
“what makes these prior events of . . . consequence [or not] are 
ordinary ideas of causation, not doctrine about when the 
seizure occurred.”77  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that 
“[t]he reasonableness of the use of force depends not only on 
whether the officers were in danger at the precise moment 
that they used force, but also on whether the officers’ own 
‘reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure 
unreasonably created the need to use such force.’” 78   The 
Tenth Circuit thus “consider[s] an officer’s conduct prior to the 
suspect’s threat of force if the conduct is ‘immediately 
connected’ to the suspect’s threat of force.”79   
This is consistent with how courts have historically 
understood other kinds of             § 1983 claims outside of the 
excessive force context.80  Section 1983 imposes liability on a 
government official who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights.”81  “Mere 
negligent actions precipitating a confrontation would not, of 
course, be actionable under § 1983,”82 which does not cover 
officers’ ‘non-tortious conduct,’ such as the use of reasonable 
                                                        
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. at 292.  
 78 Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 415 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Sevier v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995)).  
 79  Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Romero v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Lake, 60 F.3d 702, 705 n.5 
(10th Cir. 1995).  
 80 See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 
(1986) (“[T]he basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to 
compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional 
rights . . . .”).  
 81 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).  
 82 Sevier, 60 F.3d at 699 n.7.  
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force.”83  But the “requisite causal connection is satisfied if the 
defendant[s] set in motion a series of events that the 
defendant[s] knew or reasonably should have known would 
cause others to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional 
rights.’”84  
 
That is not to say that determining how attenuated the 
connection is between an officer’s conduct and an officer’s use 
of force will always be straightforward, but there are well 
established principles to guide this analysis.  First, a plaintiff 
asserting a constitutional tort under § 1983 must establish 
proximate causation.85  Proximate causation requires a direct 
relationship between the challenged conduct and the injury 
such that the injury was foreseeable,86 which is“ intended to 
say that the scope of the defendant’s liability is determined by 
the scope of the risk he [tortiously] created.”87  Second, a cause 
is not a proximate cause if an intervening force occurred that 
foreseeably led to the harm at issue.88 “[D]etermining whether 
a particular intervening force is or is not a superseding cause 
of the harm is in reality a problem of determining whether the 
intervention of the force was within the scope of the reasons 
imposing the duty upon the actor to refrain from [the 
prohibited] conduct.”89  Applying these principles to excessive 
force claims, officers are not liable for harm produced by a 
superseding cause. 90   For example, as the Third Circuit 
                                                        
 83 Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 84  Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir.1988))..  
 85  See, e.g., Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(“Section 1983 . . . require[s] a showing of proximate causation, which is 
evaluated under the common law standard.”).  
 86  A harm is not “foreseeable” simply because it is conceivable; 
rather, it must be “the natural and probable consequence.” Milwaukee & St. 
Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1876).  
 87 D. Dobbs et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 205 (2d ed. 2016).  
 88 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 420 (2011) (“A cause 
can be thought ‘superseding’ only if it is a ‘cause of independent origin that 
was not foreseeable.’”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 
2017).  
90 Bodine, 72 F.3d at 400 (citing George v. City of Long Beach, 973 
F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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observed in Bodine, if officers improperly entered without 
knocking and announcing their presence, but once inside, 
identify themselves, and are attacked by the suspect,  an 
officer would not still be liable for any harm caused to the 
suspect based on the theory that the illegal entry rendered any 
subsequent use of force unlawful.91  In short, the question is 
whether the conduct is “immediately connected” to the 
suspect’s threat of force.92  
 
On the other hand, a civilian may resist tortious police 
conduct without creating a superseding cause to the excessive 
force precipitated by the officer’s actions, unless this 
resistance goes beyond mere self-defense and creates a threat 
to the officer that was not a foreseeable response.93  In Pauly 
v. White, the Tenth Circuit was asked to determine whether 
the actions of several officers were the but-for cause of Samuel 
Pauly’s death, where the officers approached Pauly’s 
residence at night in the rain when he and his brother were in 
their home and, without knocking or announcing themselves 
as police, made threatening comments about intruding into 
the home to attack the brothers. 94  On appeal, a panel of the 
Tenth Circuit considered whether Pauly’s act of pointing a gun 
at the officers was an intervening act or within the scope of 
the original risk the officers assumed by entering Pauly’s 
home at night in a threatening manner.95  The court concluded 
that because the officers could have predicted that the two 
civilians inside the residence would open fire in response, 
                                                        
 
 
 93 Brief for the Petitioner at 55, Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 
S. Ct. 1539 (2017) 2017 WL 696103 (arguing that tortious or criminal 
reaction to police constitutes a superseding cause).  
 94 Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 1066, 1070 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017). See 137 
S. Ct. at 552 (explaining that the panel majority applied the “clearly 
established” standard at too high a level of abstraction when it conducted 
the qualified immunity analysis). 
95 Id. at 1073. 
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Pauly’s actions did not constitute a superseding cause to the 
officers’ use of force.96 
In summary, the relevance of an officer’s pre-seizure 
conduct should be determined based on how closely the 
conduct relates to the force at issue, and whether there was a 
superseding cause under traditional jurisprudential 
principles of proximate cause.97  Most courts have recognized 
the limited principle that an officer cannot rely on a civilian’s 
attempt to comply with an order or a civilian’s immediate 
reaction to police force as justification for the use of additional 
force. 98  The logical extension of this reasoning is that officers 
should be liable for excessive force when their conduct causes 
the justification for the force.99  While courts that apply the 
segmented approach struggle to analyze the relationship 
                                                        
 96 Id. at 1090.  
 97 Brief for Petitioner at 42–56, Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 2017 
WL 696103.  
 98  See, e.g., Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(observing in a case where a police officer moved towards a moving vehicle 
that “[w]here a police officer unreasonably places himself in harm’s way, his 
use of deadly force may be deemed excessive”); Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 
689, 697 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that an officer could not order a suspect to 
get out of his hiding place and then rely on the suspect’s movement to justify 
the use of lethal force); Ribbey v. Cox, 222 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that an officer could not unreasonably break a car window and then 
rely upon the suspect’s “reflex[ive] [movement] to protect himself from the 
breaking glass” to justify the use of lethal force); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 
5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a police officer cannot jump in 
front of a suspect’s car and then rely upon the danger of the oncoming car 
as justification for the use of deadly force); Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 268 
(4th Cir. 1991) (finding that an officer could not deploy an attack dog and 
then rely upon the suspect’s inability to put his hands up as the dog attacked 
him to justify a subsequent use of force); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 774 
F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a shooting directly resulting 
from decedent’s efforts to escape officers’ unwarranted physical abuse 
“g[a]ve grounds for relief under the fourth amendment”).  
99 Chiraag Bains, Can Cops Use Force with Impunity When They’ve Created 
an Unsafe Situation?  SLA T E (June 15, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/06/the_supr
eme_court_suggests_cops_use_of_force_is_always_justified.html (“Police 
officers should not be allowed to create dangerous situations that leave them with 
no choice but to use deadly force. Instead, our system should discourage such 
reckless conduct by making officers liable when they do.”). 
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between a series of events, principles of proximate causation 
provide workable rules for interpreting how to impose liability 
when a series of events interact to produce a result.  As the 
next section describes, the causation approach is not only the 
most workable, but the most promising under recent Supreme 
Court case law. 
 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SUGGESTS THAT COURTS 
SHOULD APPLY TORT PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION WHEN 
CONSIDERING PRE-SEIZURE CONDUCT  
 
 In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Supreme 
Court was asked to review the question of how courts may 
consider pre-seizure conduct in a case challenging the Ninth 
Circuit’s provocation rule.100  The Ninth Circuit’s approach 
permitted more limited evidence of pre-seizure officer conduct 
than the First, Third and Tenth Circuits.  Under what it 
termed the “provocation doctrine”, the Ninth Circuit held that 
“where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent 
confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth 
Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise 
defensive use of deadly force.” 101   Thus, if a plaintiff can 
establish unconstitutional conduct, the officer is liable for 
proximately caused harm, regardless of whether the force 
might have otherwise been reasonable. 102 
 
Mendez involved two deputies, Christopher Conley and 
Jennifer Pederson, who entered a shack that belonged to the 
Mendezes ????????????????????????????????????????????????
announcing their presence. 103  The deputies were in search of 
an armed and dangerous parolee who was not there when they  
arrived. 104  Upon entering, the deputies thought they saw Mr. 
????????????????????????????em, although it turned out what 
                                                        
 100 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).  
 101  Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002), 
abrogated by Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539.  
 102 Smith at 1189–90 (emphasis added).  
103 Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1544.  
104 Id. 
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Mr. Mendez actually possessed was a BB gun used to kill 
rodents in the home. 105   The deputies shot and seriously 
injured both Mendezes—Mrs. Mendez was shot in the back, 
and Mr. Mendez required amputation of his right leg below 
the knee.106 
 
The Mendezes sued the deputies and the County of Los 
Angeles under § 1983, asserting three distinct Fourth 
Amendment claims: warrantless entry, failure to knock-and-
announce, and excessive force.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Alito framed the issue as:  
If law enforcement officers make a “seizure” of 
a person using force that is judged to be reasonable 
based on a consideration of the circumstances relevant 
to that determination, may the officers nevertheless be 
held liable for injuries caused by the seizure on the 
ground that they committed a separate Fourth 
Amendment violation that contributed to their need to 
use force?107   
 
According to the Court, the Ninth Circuit’s provocation 
rule conflated distinct Fourth Amendment claims that should 
be analyzed independently by asking courts to “look back in 
time to see if there was a different Fourth Amendment 
violation that is somehow tied to the eventual use of force.”108  
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment provides no basis 
for the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 109   Rather, it found that 
Graham’s totality of the circumstances analysis is the only 
controlling test.110 
 
 In a footnote, the Court further explained that it had 
not granted certiorari on, and thus declined to address, the 
question of whether a totality of the circumstances analysis 
under Graham “means taking into account unreasonable 
                                                        
105 Id. at 1545. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1543.  
 108 Id. at 1547.  
 109 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1544 (2017). 
110 Id. at 1547. 
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police conduct prior to the use of force that foreseeably created 
the need to use it.”111  The Court indicated that the correct 
question to focus on was whether the excessive force at issue 
was a direct result of the deputies’ earlier Fourth Amendment 
violations “under basic notions of proximate cause,” 112  or 
whether Mr. Mendez pointing a gun was a superseding cause 
that made the deputy’s decision to shoot reasonable.  
 
  After Mendez, we know that an officer’s otherwise 
reasonable use of force is not as a matter of law unreasonable, 
simply because “(1) the officer intentionally or recklessly 
provoked a violent response, and (2) that provocation is an 
independent constitutional violation.”113  In other words, “a 
different Fourth Amendment violation cannot transform 
reasonable use of force into an unreasonable seizure.”114  But 
the question remains whether a totality of the circumstances 
analysis can take into account police conduct prior to the use 
of force that caused the need to use the excessive force at issue.  
The Court indicated that on remand the Ninth Circuit should 
consider whether there was direct causation between the prior 
act and the need to use force,115 suggesting that the Court 
would be likely to accept an approach that considers causation 
like that of the First, Third or Tenth Circuit. 
V. THE SEVERITY OF THE CRIME PROVIDES ADDITIONAL 
CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING CAUSATION 
The Supreme Court decided Graham before the 
dramatic expansion of Terry’s progeny, particularly in case 
law governing pretextual and consent searches.  Under 
present case law, an officer may ask for “consent” to search a 
civilian’s belongings without informing the civilian that he or 
                                                        
 111 Id. at 1547 n.*.  
 112 Id. at 1548.  
 113 Id. at 1546.  
 114 Id. at 1544.  
 115 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1549 (2017) 
(citing Brief of Petitioner at 31–32, Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. 
Ct. 1539 (2017) (No. 16-369), 2017 WL 696103).   
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she can decline.116  Moreover, police have greater authority to 
stop civilians for minor, nonthreatening legal violations,117 or 
even a pretextual justification.118  As Michelle Alexander has 
argued, there was a sharp turn in the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence during the War on Drugs so that 
“it is no longer necessary for the police to have any reason to 
believe that people are engaged in criminal activity or actually 
dangerous to stop and search them.” 119   And as Justice 
Sotomayor described in Utah v. Strieff, the reality is that 
today a police stop may be “suspicionless” or “one in which the 
officer initiated [a] chain of events without justification.”120  
 
As Professor Devon Carbado explains, “an ordinary 
traffic stop can be a gateway to extraordinary police violence” 
and “Fourth Amendment law help[s] to stage” the “ordinary 
police interaction whose life-and-death boundaries Fourth 
Amendment law helps to produce.” 121  Terry is the basis for 
an officer to initiate the chain of events that for some may end 
in lethal force.  With increased authority to stop and seize 
comes new opportunities for police officers to both assert 
power and use force. 
 
 One might question how the increased authority of 
officers to initiate encounters impacts courts’ analysis of the 
events that follow.  Civilians are generally expected to 
                                                        
 116 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).  
 117  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2004); Heien v. 
North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).  
 118 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that 
when police officers have probable cause to stop vehicles for traffic 
infractions, a pretextual reason for conducting the stop is irrelevant).  
 119 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 64 (2010). See JAMES 
FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 194–201 (2017) (describing the increased 
use of pre-text stops in Washington, DC’s Black neighborhoods under Eric 
H. Holder); United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]the ill-fated ‘War on Drugs’ has a sometimes overlooked 
and unmentioned casualty: the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 120 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
 121 See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing 
Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CAL. 
L. REV. 125, 150, 164 (2017).  
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acquiesce when the police assert authority or exert physical 
force in order to enforce a lawful action.  The right to make an 
investigatory stop, arrest, or other seizure encompasses the 
right to use some degree of physical force or other 
demonstration of power to effect it.122  But when the basis of 
this authority is a minor traffic violation, the latitude courts 
typically extend to law enforcement officers to use force in 
order to neutralize potentially dangerous suspects is 
undermined because there is no reason to assume that the 
suspect is dangerous.  The fact that Castille’s deadly 
encounter with Officer Yanez began over a broken brake light 
outraged many because it seemed to violate Fourth 
Amendment values, which balance the nature and quality of 
the intrusion with the countervailing governmental interests 
at stake; while a violent fleeing felon has forfeited the right to 
a less intrusive seizure, a driver with a broken brake light has 
not.  
 The conduct that precipitated the seizure matters, not 
just as context for understanding the seizure as an isolated 
segment, but as context for understanding the entire chain of 
events.  The case Estate of Starks v. Enyart123 also illustrates 
this point.   The Seventh Circuit panel reviewing the use of 
lethal force found it relevant to the analysis that the officers 
knew “that the underlying crime was not accomplished 
violently.” 124   The court observed: “If a fleeing felon is 
converted to a ‘threatening’ fleeing felon solely based on the 
actions of a police officer,” basic Fourth Amendment tenets 
would become meaningless.125 
 The severity of the crime at issue must inform the 
causation analysis.  First, the severity of the crime is critical 
in the evaluation of aggression.  While a more aggressive 
tactic may be warranted initially when the police are chasing 
a murder suspect, there is no justification for undertaking an 
                                                        
 122 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968).  
 123 Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (1993).  
 124 Id. at 233.  
 125 Id. at 234.  
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aggressive approach initially when an individual is merely 
suspected of a minor traffic violation.  The crime at issue also 
matters in understanding the civilian’s response to the 
officer’s conduct because of the civilian’s interest in remaining 
free from state-sponsored violence.  Courts must evaluate how 
civilians will predictably respond to aggressive police tactics 
considering that the civilian was not suspected of dangerous 
or threatening conduct.  Aggressive displays of power under 
these circumstances are almost always experienced as 
disproportionate and threatening.  Thus, understanding 
whether an officer predictably created legitimate resistance 
by employing an overly aggressive tactic requires 
consideration of the crime at issue from the officer’s 
perspective. 
 The reality that traffic or other minor violations can 
provide legal sanction for police to initiate severe intrusions 
feeds the feeling that any slight violation could provide the 
basis for a police officer to enact discrimination based upon 
race under the guise of legitimate punishment. 126   As 
described in the quote at the outset, some African Americans 
may comply with police authority not because they view it as 
legitimate, but because they feel unfairly “trapped” by officers 
who rely on increased authority to initiate encounters, and 
then seek to provoke a reaction that may provide a basis for 
punishment.  This feeling of being trapped is not merely 
imagined; as this Article has described, some courts continue 
to conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis in excessive 
force cases without even considering how conduct of officers 
may have contributed to the justification for the officer’s need 
to use force, much less holding officers accountable.  
 
Of course, there is a risk that causation will be more 
clearly understood with the benefit of hindsight and courts 
ought not impose rules that “undercut the necessary element 
                                                        
 126 For an account of how overreliance on aggressive assertions of 
authority “inevitably engenders individual-level and community-wide 
pushback and resistance that can escalate into violence,” see Devon W. 
Carbado, Blue-On-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the 
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479 (2016).  
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of judgment inherent in a constable’s attempts to control a 
volatile chain of events.”127  But a causation analysis simply 
imposes a duty on officers to anticipate the reasonable results 
of their actions, and need not hamper their ability to do their 
jobs.  The Fourth Circuit case, Estate of Armstrong ex rel. 
Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst128 provides a good example 
of this.129  The civilian in that case, Armstrong, suffered from 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.  Police were called to 
enforce an involuntary commitment order compelling him to 
be hospitalized after his doctor identified him as a danger to 
himself.130  When police ordered Armstrong to return to the 
hospital, Armstrong wrapped his body around a stop sign and 
refused to comply.131  In response, the police officers tased him 
five times.132  When he continued to resist, they removed him 
by force, cuffed, and shackled him.133  During the course of the 
struggle, Armstrong died.134  In finding that the use of force 
was unreasonable, a panel of the Fourth Circuit wrote: 
“Tasing Armstrong did not force him to succumb to [the] 
seizure—he actually increased his resistance in response . . . 
Had Appellees limited themselves to permissible uses of force 
when seizing Armstrong, they would have had every tool 
needed to control and resolve the situation at their 
disposal.”135  Thus, under the court’s analysis, the officers’ 
decision to tase Armstrong was not only unjustified—his 
noncompliance did not warrant this level of force given that 
he did not present a threat to officer safety—but also 
ineffective, as their use of force actually increased his 
resistance and escalated the situation.136  
 
                                                        
127 Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2002). 
128 Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 
810 F.3d 892, 896 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Vill. of Pinehurst, N.C. v. 




132 Id. at 897. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 898. 
135 Id. at 906. 
136 Id.  
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Viewing excessive force claims as a chain of events is 
essential to untangling “the trap” by creating accountability 
for police conduct that escalates an interaction.  By 
incorporating principles of causation, excessive force claims 
have the potential to provide an important deterrent to police 
officers’ abuse of the increased power and discretion that 
Terry’s progeny provide.  While Fourth Amendment law 
generally may be moving in the direction of permitting 
increased intrusions for minor crimes,137 excessive force case 
law can provide an increasingly important check on this trend 
by limiting how aggressive police conduct can justify police 
force later in the encounter.  Considering excessive force 
claims in terms of the chain of events is essential to ensuring 
that the totality of the circumstances analysis reaches a result 
that is in line with long-established and fundamental Fourth 
Amendment principles.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
In the wake of repeated police shootings of young, 
unarmed, Black men and women, police departments across 
the country are focusing on de-escalation.138  In contrast with 
                                                        
 137 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 339–40, 345, 
354 (2001) (explaining why custodial arrests even for very minor criminal 
offenses do not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
 138   INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NATIONAL 
CONSENSUS POLICY ON USE OF FORCE 3 (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.theiacp.Org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/ 
National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force.pdf (recommending training 
on de-escalation and proscribing that officers “shall use de-escalation 
techniques and other alternatives to higher levels of force . . . 
whenever possible and appropriate before resorting to force and to reduce 
the need for force”). See also Tom Jackman, De-Escalation Training to 




ac42097b8cc0_story.html?utm_term=.1922bc753fe2. (“[I]n about 40 percent 
of [lethal police shooting] cases, the subject does not have a gun, and many 
police officials think that reducing the intensity of such encounters, 
establishing more distance between officer and subject, and simply talking 
to the person can result in no shots being fired and less trauma on all 
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this approach, federal courts often continue to analyze Fourth 
Amendment excessive force cases from the moment force is 
employed without considering how police conduct earlier in an 
encounter may have contributed to the need for subsequent 
force.  Moreover, judges often assume that force serves the 
interest of officer safety and civilian compliance, rather than 
exacerbating a situation under some circumstances and 
increasing risks. The assumptions that guide judicial analysis 
are therefore fundamentally out of touch with standard 
policies and best practices in policing, which should instead 
inform the analysis that courts apply.139  
 
This Article has argued that an officer should not be 
permitted to use force when the officer predictably created the 
need for force by employing an overly aggressive tactic.  
Existing legal principles for understanding causation can be 
applied in excessive force cases to determine whether the 
officer created the circumstances justifying the need to use 
force and whether the actions of the civilian constituted a 
superseding cause.  The severity of the crime provides key 
context for this causation analysis. 
 
While a civilian’s failure to comply generally 
authorizes an officer to use additional force, an exception 
should occur when it can be said that the officer’s approach 
predictably caused the civilian to resist.  This limitation would 
prevent officers from manufacturing authority to use force by 
employing overly aggressive tactics or other misconduct that 
is likely to provoke civilian resistance.  As the justification for 
asserting authority weakens, so does the line between legal 
police force and illegal state-sponsored violence.  Thus, the 
                                                        
sides.”); Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn 
to De-escalate, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-police-
warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html.  
 139 See, e.g., Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(finding that the police department’s policy was relevant to the 
reasonableness analysis). See also Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1554 
(10th Cir. 1995) (violations of police regulation do not alone give rise to 
a Section 1983 claim).  
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implications of making tort-based causation distinctions are 
important for ensuring that the next generation of citizens 
views the criminal justice system as legitimate, instead of a 
trap.   
 
Police departments are beginning to recognize the 
importance of how an officer’s behavior influences the need to 
use force later on, and while this is an important step in the 
right direction, the change required is not just a question of 
policing.  Courts must play an essential interpretative role in 
addressing this justice concern as well.    
